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Abstract: The importance of entrepreneurship in our society is the way it stimulate the 
markets through alertness to opportunities, and being creational of new opportunity-ideas. 
However, entrepreneurship is usually constrained by normative, regulative and cognitive 
mechanisms that enforces and forms the basis on which the entrepreneur operates. This leads 
us to the primary question of this thesis: to identify factors and conditions that prevents 
entrepreneurship from prospering within the less developed parts of the world. To do this, we 
have to understand the complexity behind entrepreneurship as the product of entrepreneurs. 
Further, we need an understanding for the constraints lain upon them as a result of growing up 
within Less Developed Countries (LDCs)
1
. The purpose of this thesis is especially to identify 
poor entrepreneurs and the barriers they might face due to their standard of living. How lack 
of financial assets, educational possibilities within the field, regulated property rights, free 
market conditions, and institutional behavior, all can become heavy burdens for poor 
entrepreneurs, trying to create something out of nothing based on a new opportunity-idea. 
Finally, we shall present some policy recommendations for LDCs that can stimulate changes 
for the better, and by which entrepreneurship can be encourage and stimulated.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Less developed countries will be defined as countries that are less developed in terms of their economy, 
infrastructure and industrial base. The populations, and therefore the poor entrepreneurs acting within these 
countries, are usually constrained by low standard of living (primary securities), due to low incomes and 
abundant poverty (investopedia.com).   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The world is filled with different possibilities and opportunities based on where a person 
happened to be born. Unfortunately, it can also force segments of the population to live under 
low living standards, constrained by the minds behind the climate that surrounds them and 
imposes different barriers. This makes it very difficult for entrepreneurs, living within these 
less developed parts of the world, to act on a new idea and create something out of noting. 
Which leads us to the purpose of this thesis: to identify factors and conditions that prevents 
entrepreneurship from prospering in these less developed parts of the world. This is to enable 
a deeper understanding for how the lack of financial assets, educational possibilities within 
the field, regulated property rights, free market conditions, and institutional behavior can 
create barriers for poor entrepreneurs. These are often formed by the minds of citizens and 
leaders through normative, regulative, and cognitive enforcement mechanisms, and can be 
very difficult to change. We shall also see that primary securities are preventing many poor 
entrepreneurs from even trying on a new opportunity-idea, because of the risk involved and 
the consequences of failure.   
However, before we take on these problems we shall provide the reader with an understanding 
of the complexity behind entrepreneurship and why it is of such importance. For example, a 
poor person running a small shop just to stay alive is not the same thing as being an 
entrepreneur. This can be exemplified with a reality-based example of true entrepreneurship 
conducted in India: a woman one day decided to start collect and sell trash that she found on 
the streets. After a while she figured out that she could convince others to do the same for a 
reasonable amount of money, and that she then could save enough money to invest in a small 
storeroom. Here, they began to sort the trash because it paid far more money than unsorted 
trash. In this way she began to grow what today is a multimillion dollar trash collecting 
company
2
. This company is a product of her daring to take a risk in a new idea that due to a 
combination of her innovational and creational mindset was able to blossom through different 
opportunities. However, for entrepreneurs to be able to tell a likewise successful story they 
should not only be lucky, hardworking and daring. They must also be surrounded by the right 
mental climate, and be provided the right kind of tools, and support. This can only be 
developed and provided through an understanding of the nature of entrepreneurship, and the 
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 Source: Banerjee and Duflo, 2011. 
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processes itself. Only then can we combat entrepreneurial failures among the poor and 
succeed in development, resulting in economic growth.  
Today the literature on entrepreneurship among poor is often divided into distinct areas 
separated from each other, and is therefore not providing a concrete and complete picture of 
entrepreneurship within these LDCs. To do this, we shall provide a meta-synthesis based on 
qualitative research and studies on entrepreneurship among the poor, in which we have 
chosen examples mostly from Asian countries. This will not only provide a better 
understanding of entrepreneurship, but also ground some policy recommendations to LDCs 
for higher achievements and development within the field of entrepreneurship.   
2. ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
To introduce the concept of entrepreneurship it is important to give as clear definition of this 
complex subject as possible, to understand its significant role in economic development 
through economic growth, and how to measure entrepreneurship so it can be improved.  
2.1 Defining entrepreneurship  
Defining entrepreneurship is difficult due to its complexity and there is no agreement 
(Gartner, 1990). The subject’s characteristics, dynamics, determinants and manifestations 
differ across countries (Naudé, 2011). This makes it of such importance to give a clear and 
distinct definition of entrepreneurship, to understand its meaning throughout my thesis.  
Joseph Schumpeter thought of the existing national economic theories and its focus on 
equilibriums in the markets as something incomplete. By bringing entrepreneurship back into 
debate he wanted to change the traditional view and explain its significant role for economic 
development (Landström, 2000). He thought of entrepreneurs as innovators that did not 
passively follow the existing economic order surrounding us.  Instead, he argued, they cause 
change from within to disrupt existing equilibria (Schumpeter, 1934/2006). Through 
recognition of market opportunities and risk-taking (Naudé, 2011), entrepreneurs could move 
the market toward a new equilibrium, and gain profits from spotting arbitrage possibilities by 
reallocation of resources.  
Today entrepreneurship is looked upon as something that contributes to renewal and change 
from within the economy (Henrekson, 2007). That identifies new economic opportunities, and 
then introduces these to the market under uncertainty (Weenekers and Thurik, 1999). This by 
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using its innovative spirit as an entrepreneur to creatively calculate risk, skillfully use the 
environment, see values of business propositions for themselves and the society at large, and 
while seeking and making good use of opportunities (Velasco, 2013). Furthermore, a 
distinction between entrepreneurship and self-employment as a last resort income must be 
stated. By this I mean mass coping or mimics of already existing ideas and that is a sustainer 
of the change created by the true entrepreneurs. If you walked down almost any street in a city 
belonging to a LCD you would most likely find yourself surrounded by a huge amount of 
similar shops that have copied the business ideas surrounding them. These individuals are not 
entrepreneurs and will throughout this thesis be viewed as casual workers.   
2.2 Why entrepreneurship is important in LDCs 
If we assume that entrepreneurial and innovational activities can be defined as a technological 
process
3
, and that the latter matters for economic growth and a higher quality of life. Then it 
would be straightforward to conclude that entrepreneurs will matter for economic 
development and, with other words, it is a path out of poverty for societies.  
Entrepreneurship achieves important functions related to efficiency, competition, product 
innovation, pricing and industry survival by acting either to disequilibrate (Schumpeter 
1911/1934), to equilibrate (Kirzer 1997) or to do both. This bipolar view will have an effect 
on the market in different ways. Schumpeter wanted to create new opportunities by 
introducing new innovations on the market too distort the existing equilibrium. On the 
contrary, Kirzer found that opportunities was a result of reinforcing equilibrating forces on the 
market, based on arbitrage drawing on market errors (Shane, 2003).  
Traditional microeconomic price theories are assuming that the market will find equilibrium 
under perfect competition. What this say is that in the state of equilibrium on the market, we 
have perfect information and therefore the prices reflect the value of underlying resources. By 
introducing new opportunities form outside this existing sphere (and therefore yet not 
reflected in the existing price system), Schumpeter believed that entrepreneurs pushed the 
existing equilibrium market away from equilibrium. The essence of an entrepreneur is to 
break away from routine, to destroy existing structures, and move the system away from the 
even flow of equilibrium (conflicting with the neoclassical model). Kirzer on the other hand 
wants to better understand the nature of the market process and the dynamics of market 
competitions. He argues that the market is in a constant disequilibrium, and that the main 
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 Referring to the definition invented by Nicholas Kaldor (1957).  
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focus should be on dynamic and competitive processes that pushes the economy towards 
equilibrium. The entrepreneurs will find these competitive advantages and present them as 
opportunities. They will then be valued and copied by others, and this will lead to the market 
finding itself in a new state of equilibrium (Kirzner, 2009/1997; Shane, 2003; De Jong, 2010).  
We could view both of these theories in light of the production-possibility curve to illustrate 
the differences. Schumpeter finds the entrepreneurs on the edge of existing production; 
inventing new possibilities and pushing the possibility-production curve out in disequilibrium. 
Kirzner on the other hand finds entrepreneurs as some sort of intermediary that utilize existing 
resource possibilities that others cannot see, pushing us in to equilibrium (see Figure 0). 
Today many economists think of both theories as complements to one another – Schumpeter 
positioning us in disequilibria and Kirzner acting on these new opportunities (Landström, 
2000). 
The impact of entrepreneurship can take different forms as stated above.  Still it is a general 
belief that it will contribute to job creation, wealth creation, innovation and have related 
welfare effects. We will choose to emphasize Schumpeter’s ‘creational’ view on 
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entrepreneurship and Kirzer ‘alertness’ to imperfection on the market, to describe the 
significant role entrepreneurs play in economic development. We will argue for the 
importance of change in technological processes, due to entrepreneurship as one of the most 
important factors for economic growth. Built on, the demand for new products and services, 
more efficient production methods, and change in the existing economic climate within LDCs 
can hopefully result in poverty reduction.  
2.3 How to measure entrepreneurship in LCDs 
Measuring entrepreneurship is of great importance for the creation and implementation of 
new and better programs, and enabling better evaluations. However, documenting, measuring 
and thereby to understanding entrepreneurship is difficult because of the characteristic and 
dynamics involved. Available indicators try to measure things like personal attributes of the 
entrepreneur and the outcome of the entrepreneurial process (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011).  
Personal attributes of the entrepreneur usually intend to measure gender based factors, or 
factors that can be broadly described by the Five-Factor model, including the following 
measurements: Openness to experience (specific traits include being artistic, curious, 
imaginative, insightful, original, and wide interest), (2) Conscientiousness (efficient, 
organized, strategic, reliable, responsible, thorough), (3) Extraversion (active, assertive, 
energetic, enthusiastic, outgoing, talkative), (4) Agreeableness (appreciative, forgiving, 
generous, kind, sympathetic, trusting), (5) and Neuroticism (anxious, self-pitying, tense, 
touchy, unstable, worrying) (McCrae and Costa, 1987). Also The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OCED) launched the Entrepreneurship Indicators Program 
(EIP) in order to collect internationally comparable statistics on entrepreneurship and its 
determinants (oecd.org).   
To measure the outcome of entrepreneurial process is difficult and requires a deliberate 
degree of segmentation. This because no measure does capture all entrepreneurial activities in 
any country, let alone for comparison consistently across countries. Another reason is that 
only some types of entrepreneurship are of research interest (Naudé, 2011). Self-employment 
rate is one way to try measuring entrepreneurial outcomes. However, firstly it might not be 
adequately reflecting the context in LDCs, due to the informal sector
4
 and the unreported data 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2011) Secondly, it does not follow the given definition of 
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 To be accounted for as a formal or informal business has exclusively to do with the registration status of the 
firm. It has to be registered with an appropriated governmental agency to be included in the formal sector 
(Naudé, 2011).  
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entrepreneurship and its implications will be illustrated by The Global Entrepreneurships 
Monitor (GEM) project. Nevertheless, under the assumption that if it is collected from a 
standardized source, it could be easy to compare cross countries and this is the reason why it 
is such a widespread measurement.  
The GEM project tries to produce data that can be comparable across countries, by collecting 
data on early-stage entrepreneurship that comprises two measures. First, we have start-up 
activity that is measured as ‘nascent entrepreneurship’ and is counted as the proportion of the 
adult population that is currently engaged in the process of creating a business. Second, the 
firm’s activities are measured as ‘baby entrepreneurship’, and are counted as the proportion of 
the adult population that is currently involved in operating a business that is less than 42 
months. This type of data is likely to overestimate early-stage entrepreneurship activities. For 
example, respondents may be considered nascent entrepreneurs if they have taken steps to 
form a business. However, these steps may not be materialized for several years – or in worst 
case scenario, they may never be. This because taking the steps to form a business does not 
automatically mean that the business has met all official regulatory criteria (Naudé, 2011). 
Also it falsely indicates on some countries to be more entrepreneurial than others, by using 
non excluding measurement from what we defined as self-employment errors. In Table 1 we 
can see that this would indicate on Peru to be the most entrepreneurial country with 
significant more start-ups than, for example Japan, with almost no new business activity.  
 
  Nascent Baby 
Iceland 7,83 4,46 
Peru 31,36 12,93 
Uganda 16,01 18,02 
Sweden 1,81 2,87 
Japan 0,96 1,21 
Hong Kong 1,61 1,58 
India 5,42 5,31 
Source:  Sameeksha Desai (2009) 
 
The World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey (WBGES) measures formal data that are 
designed to be comparable across countries. They do not include the informal sector, counting 
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only ‘economic units of the formal sector incorporated as a legal5 entity and registered in a 
public registry, which is capable, in its own right, of incurring liabilities and of engaging in 
economic activities and transactions with other entities.’ They should be able to compare the 
data despite different political system and legal origins (Naudé, 2011). 
It can also be difficult to measure entrepreneurship due to the institutional environment. 
Including being clear about the quality of the measurement being used, and what is actually 
examined. For example: measuring formal activity does not include informal activity (a large 
sector of the labor force in LDCs) and therefore cannot be seen as a measurement for the 
countries activity. It is of great importance to understand the relation between selected 
measurement and the economic development context of the country. By targeting the 
entrepreneurial context you seek and maybe wish to formalize through policy interventions – 
bring informal sectors into formal, or maybe focus on entrepreneurial growth. Also you will 
usually find different result for the same variables using different data (especially cross-
country studies). Countries can host multiple types of entrepreneurship in different ‘mixes’ 
determined by the context – legal and illegal, formal and informal, necessity and opportunity. 
As an example Bangalore is hosting high growth in the biotechnology sector, while Mumbai 
in India is home to many informal new firms (many of these might growth to a level were 
formalization is necessary).  
 
3. CLIMATE FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP  
The way formal and informal institutions works within LDCs will have a significant effect on 
entrepreneurship conducted within these countries. The direction they choose to take seems to 
be based on the thinking of its citizens and the kind of leadership it is under. In this section we 
will look into some enforcement mechanisms that have an important role in the enabling or 
preventing of entrepreneurship. We will also revise institutional change for the better 
concerning entrepreneurs. Finally, the importance of property rights and free markets will be 
brought into the light for entrepreneurial actions, and how soft budget constraints can affect 
entrepreneurship.    
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 This has to do with the activities a firm is engaging in and should not be interchanged with the formal/informal 
dichotomy (Naudé, 2011). For example, illegal activities can be producing drugs, mining in prohibited areas, or 
hunting almost extinct animals to sell parts of them.    
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3.1 Institutions 
Institutions can plays the significant role of lowering barriers to market entry and exit for 
entrepreneurs. Both the informal and formal institutions seem to have important roles to play 
in enabling entrepreneurial actions resulting in economic development within LDCs. Usually 
defining ‘the rules of the game’ and thereby the crucial impact it has on the way individuals 
and organizations behave and interact, as well as how societies preform and develop socially, 
politically and economical (Skoog, 2005). ‘Institutions can be defined as interrelated informal 
and formal elements – customs, conventions, norms, beliefs, and rules – governing social 
relationships within which actors pursue and fix the limits of legitimate interests. They are 
self-reproducing social structures that provide a conduit for collective action by enabling, 
motivating, and guiding the interests of actors and enforcing principal – agent relationships’ 
(Nee and Opper, 2012).  It defines the rules of engagement (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011), and 
through repeating behavior (conducted of these above informal and formal elements) it 
creates habits and routines within the society (Alam, 2002). Of significant importance for us 
is the understanding of its effects on the mode of business activities (entrepreneurship and 
innovation). Meaning that the system will be based on the thinking of its people, and differ 
between cultures. Thus, in most LDCs it will be constructed by the habits and routines 
evolved by men (Alam, 2002). Thereby, various actors; like suppliers, customers, and 
employer-employees, will be affected, that has a significant role to play in entrepreneurial 
actions among the poor. Something that not necessarily always encourages all citizens to 
invest, accumulate, and develop new technologies, as a result of which society will prosper. 
 
3.2 Institutional effects on entrepreneurship 
As argued, entrepreneurship seems to have a significant role in alleviating poverty through 
destruction of existing equilibria. Informal and formal institutions can find themselves work 
either for or against entrepreneurial actions within a society, through lowering or raising 
barriers to market entry or exit. These informal and formal institutions can be strengthened or 
weakened by three components concerning entrepreneurship, namely: normative, regulative 
and cognitive mechanisms (Shetri, 2007)).   
Normative enforcement mechanisms refer to culturally sanctioned and tolerated codes of 
conduct, including all kinds of behavioral codes within industries and professions, families, 
ethnic groups and other communities (Shane, 2003). These mechanisms will rule within both 
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the formal and informal sectors. The perception of entrepreneurship in society will therefore 
be of significant importance, and it is usually affected by its leaders. They might as the 
communist regime of China – before the privatization begun 1978 – neglect private owned 
property (Nee and Opper, 2012), and entrepreneurs then had to fulfill social obligations 
(Shetri, 2007) hindering them from self-selected development. Other institutions may enforce 
cultural constraints on entrepreneurship not tolerating all kinds of business activities, or make 
the perception of entrepreneurship highly negative. However, nowadays many leaders are 
trying to change the attitude towards entrepreneurs throughout society, and make 
entrepreneurship something desirable among its citizens (Nee and Opper, 2012).  
Regulative enforcement mechanisms are given by formal institutions and can hinder 
entrepreneurial ventures from development by making them unable expand, or even set-up. 
These mechanisms usually take expression in form of weak laws related to private property 
rights that is of importance for entrepreneurship (Nee and Opper, 2012). Also, poor 
enforcement mechanisms are a common result of weak formal institutions that fails to provide 
institutions that can make different markets free of illegal activities (Banerjee and Nee, 2011). 
This can also work as a hinder for entrepreneurs trying to escape the informal sector, by not 
providing registration opportunities.  
Cognitive enforcement mechanisms are reflected in a culture of complacency, conformity and 
risk aversion. These attitudes vary between LDCs towards entrepreneurship and are many 
times looked upon as either an act of individuals that cannot find a regular job, or as success. 
Risk-taking is a very important element in entrepreneurship and is not as acceptably applied 
in many LDCs compared to western countries. However, this view on risk-taking is starting to 
catch-up as these countries are going oversee and exchanging knowledge (Shetri, 2007). 
Acceptance of failure among citizens could result in creation of institutions providing 
safeguards in form of assurance for entrepreneurs in case of failure.    
Formal institutions will only work successfully if individuals are able to establish a basic level 
of trust in the reliability of exchanges, sanctions, and penalties that may be imposed. Trust in 
the institutional framework will allow entrepreneurs to enter into transactions with only 
limited information about their transaction partners (Shane, 2003). This because the formal 
institutions will provide legal safeguards and sanctions which informal institutions – in most 
cases – can only provide to a limited extent (Nee and Opper, 2012). This is if, as argued 
above, these three presented mechanism can enforce institutions to establish favorable 
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conditions under which entrepreneurs can work and prosper. However, it is only in situations 
where formal and informal institutions combine and forms a coherent framework that this 
kind of change can occur. For example, formal regulations and the rules of law will 
predominately shape individuals behavior. So within fragile settings with institutional 
deficiencies and conflicts, non-compliance with the formal rules becomes pervasive, and 
informal enforcement mechanisms will typically dominate (Shane, 2003).      
A major problem is usually that formal institutions seem to change faster than informal 
institutions which might result in conflicts between both. This in regard to the difficulties in 
changing people’s way of thinking due to the underlying values, norms, and beliefs that it is 
built on. Also as argued by Schumpeter ‘Key institutional innovations are norms and informal 
practices that allow producer to shift from small-scale household production to new forms of 
capitalist enterprises.’ A similar conclusion can be derived from a multilevel model6 
explaining the bottom-up effect in China that enabled the transition towards privatization. 
This was because people relied, in their business activities, on family reputation, this in the 
lack of working formal institution. This empowered the citizens of China to commit 
entrepreneurial actions (Nee and Opper, 2012).    
3.3 Institutional change 
To change an institution lead by unconstructive thinking and behavior, toward encouragement 
of citizens to invest, accumulate, and develop new technologies, by which society most likely 
will prosper is essential. Thereby, they create an environment that will work for entrepreneur-
ship, and establish demand for entrepreneurial actions on the market. However, institutional 
change is not necessarily believed in general or wished upon by leaders among LDCs 
countries to be encouraging entrepreneurship (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). However, this type 
of institutional change is to be argued for throughout this section.         
There are countless of theories of how to implement institutional change usually referring to 
empirical evidence. Some arguing for the European Union (EU) and the way it foster its new 
members towards entrepreneurial action that is generally believed to result in development 
(Hjorth, 2012). Others arguing for change of leadership inspired by Hong Kong and the 
British History – saying that if you cannot lead your country then leave it to someone who 
can. In China a way of coexisting between economic social-political dimensions is preferable, 
                                                          
6
 Institutional change can be derived in China through its bottom-up effect that enabled the transition towards 
privatization through a multilevel model that included following steps: (1) market competition, (2) 
entrepreneurial actions, (3) mutual monitoring and enforcement, and (4) mimicking (Nee and Opper, 2012).     
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and therefore searching for a solution within the existing institutional system (Hjorth, 2012). 
However, more generally believed are maybe programs and education that enables people to 
get richer and through which good intuitions will emerge and break the vicious circle 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2011).    
An example of a normative change in India, a country with a high degree of informality. 
There an institutional change has begun to emerge in hand with dignity. A study with focus on 
children, rural women and bounded labor as a key-factor for institutional changes, shows that 
women standing up for their own dignity is a strong norm breaker in India. They have for 
example through different moneylenders of microcredits been able to make their own 
decisions regarding economic investment, saving and spending. However, even if they are 
involved in using the money they do still not control the main economic assets – that still is 
under the control of men (Olsen and Morgan, 2010).  
There seems to be countless of ways to enable institutional change that could be argued for or 
against. Most likely there is as many ways to make a change possible as there are countries. 
However, the important thing is not change itself but rather the enabling of entrepreneurial 
activities. To understand that change often comes from understanding these three mechanisms 
presented above and how we can force them to encourage entrepreneurial activities and 
thereby enable development. Enable informal and formal institutions to make these ‘rules of 
the game’ fair, and based on equal conditions.   
 
3.3.1 Property Rights 
Historically the question have mostly been about handling the use of labor and land as it 
became an important factor in production, and through which property rights started to 
emerges. Today we know these rights as ownership rights by one individual or family. The 
economic definition of property rights usually refers to the use or control over a resource or a 
goods (Ray, 1998). With other words, if ownership of a resource gives you the rights to use 
the output from it in the way you like. It is crucial for entrepreneurs that are setting up new 
businesses and wish to maximize their profit to be able to control the earnings from its output, 
transfer it in the way it like, and have enforcement rights on their property (Guerin, 2003). 
However, this is hardly the case in most LDCs where unconstructive informal and formal 
institutions hinder entrepreneurs from entrepreneurship. This by regulating the environment 
surrounding property rights (both implicit or/and implicit), by either prescriptive control or 
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command approaches, or through market based instruments. The last one will constrain the 
entrepreneurs from using his or her resources in the way they like, by implementing taxes, 
subsides, quotas, and transferable permits on goods and services. Another obstacle that could 
prevent entrepreneurs from using their resources could be normative, for example old 
traditional values (e.g. new rights for private ownership of land that previously have been 
used collectively which results in people not caring for the new ownership form), or informal 
institutions that works outside the legal system (e.g. mafia organizations).  The first one will 
limit the use of input and output quantities, restrict the entrepreneurs to process them in the 
way he or she wish and also decide the equipment that can be used. These two regulations 
might have a devastating effect on entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial action on the market. 
3.3.1.1 Property rights illustrated in China 
During the last decades, China has gone through an enormous development and become a 
strong competitor on the market. Economist all over the world, are asking themselves, how 
this could happen in the absence of credit markets, courts and other market institutions, highly 
regulated by its leaders. Thereby, they made entrepreneurship almost impossible due to these 
impediments for market entry and exit (Opper and Nee, 2012).  
This brings us to a very important subject for a deeper understanding of Chinas progress to 
better and more equal property rights, namely trust. To understand this better we can imagine 
different equilibria in Prisoner’s Dilemma. Under rational decision we could expect all other 
parties (under governmental favorable conditions) to cheat and rationally so would we if we 
could. This would give us an equilibrium not favoring any party under self-defeating 
incentives. Opposite we could trust in others, but there would always be a risk in others 
finding a better deal. Contract by law under a working legal system could ensure us by a 
written contract under the law that they could not leave just for a better deal. Still, the people 
in china did not and all still do not trust the legal system (McMillan and Woodruff, 2001). 
This leads us in to the main reason why China could make such a fast and dramatic change in 
property rights. In the families, there is no Prisoner’s Dilemma, because each is confident that 
the others can be counted on. As an example, ‘You can settle any dispute if you keep lawyers 
and accountants out of it. They just do not understand the give-and-take needed in businesses 
(McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). A China novo business was built on trust within families 
and on their reputations. Economics, social networks and informal gossip substitute for a 
formal legal system, while business networks and trade associations work in conjunction with 
it. The former bureaucratic control system during the planned economy got replaced by 
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market-oriented formal and informal laws. Even though informal laws like norms is playing a 
major role in Chinas private sector it has to be in the shadows of a working formal legal 
system. Because without courts the firms might not be willing to produce complex goods and 
invest in technical advancement that initially can be very costly to produce complex goods. 
Belief in courts and contracts they may provide will equal in changed behavior (McMillan 
and Woodruff, 2001).  
So how did people dare to invest initially in their company’s future without working formal 
institutions doing arrangement concerning contracts, property rights, laws, regulations, and 
the state? The answer is: through informal constraints based on collective actions to enforcing 
rules. In China this was embedded in norms and networks operating in the shadows of formal 
organizational rules, both limited and facilitated economic actions (Nee, 1998). Trade 
associations and private firms started to sell and provide information on businesses not 
keeping their end of the bargaining. In China threats of public exposure was, under the 1990’s 
and still is, an effective way to collect money. A close relationship between collectors and the 
press were often established (McMillan and Woodruff, 2001).   
This tells us that sometimes development through entrepreneurship must begin on its own 
within the informal sector, in the absence of the formal highly regulated sector. Institutional 
change sometimes must come from within, and not from the outside. China was able to 
change due to the bottom-up effect that found its way around the lack of working institution 
and the highly regulated markets, built on trust for each other to collectively be able to 
enforce right and wrong. Thereby, they opened up for entrepreneurial set-up opportunities, 
which in its second phase enabled institutional change resulting in increasing economic 
development. Further, this concludes what was already stated above, that informal and formal 
institutions must work jointly to enable development among the LDC. Also it tells us that 
change does not need to be forced from above (as many thought above). Instead it can come 
from within, making people wealthier and in this way change for the better will occur. 
3.3.2 Free Markets 
We commonly define a free market economy as something allowing buyers and sellers to 
transact freely based on their mutual agreement on prices without state interventions (taxes, 
subsidies or other kinds regulation). The concept of free markets are beloved by many 
economics, and described as the oxygen needed for entrepreneurship (Tiwari, S. and Tiwari, 
A., 2007). Usually derived from the Laissez-faire principle that refers to ‘the ideology of non-
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interference in the affairs of others, particularly with reference to government interferences on 
economic matters. Markets should, in this doctrine, be left to operate ‘naturally’ according to 
economic laws’ (Down, 2010).  However, during the last decades we have seen countries like 
China arise following a more state controlled program. China has, for example, grown to be 
the world’s second largest economy by losing its grip on entrepreneurs, and by focusing its 
resources (Kressel and Lento, 2012).  
The transition toward an open economy with freer markets will be of significant importance 
for entrepreneurs. This because it will generate a better entrepreneurial climate with lower 
transactions costs, where information asymmetries will be less sever, and financial services 
will be available to a larger extent. For example, in Nigeria the entrepreneurs find the lack of 
credits, poor transportation infrastructure and the lack of independent utilities as the leading 
constraints of firm growth. On most occasions, this is a result of government monopolization 
of production that frustrates organizational development and productivity (Acs and Audretsch, 
2012). Usually they target demand of industries that have a major strategic function to play 
which will result in new comers to be of the same kind of businesses (Kressel and Lento, 
2012).  
However, free markets are by LDCs countries not always preferable among the poor that are 
not able to participate in the market. Instead they believe poor should wait until the market 
finds them (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). At first this might sound unfair to poor people 
(entrepreneurs) wishing to participate in the market. However, just because a person believes 
himself to do well in something, it might not be viewed in the same light by others. As an 
illustrative example that could easily be understood by any person that have been to Delhi, in 
India, and seen its traffic would understand –  that free markets might not always be optimal. 
The government allowing a free-market on driving license, leading to the price determines 
how fast you will get it, and not skills and knowledge.     
Sometimes it might be necessary to allow the government to enforce rules and norms that 
make these countries function. Try to solve problems that markets cannot solve by itself 
initially (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). Even set in a global context totally free markets would 
not be optimal. Gray argues that in order for there to be less barriers to trade there needs to be 
new structure and regulation to achieve it. ‘Freer markets aren’t simply the absence of 
regulation. The differences that exist between national economies, their regulations on labor, 
wage differentials and so forth are what global competitive markets thrives on. It is these 
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differences that entrepreneurs exploit. Totally free markets are an impossible reality; Gray 
calls it a utopia’ (Down, 2010). 
Potential entrepreneurs should observe the strategies and business operations of existing 
entrepreneurs and gather information about potential markets, input suppliers, and production 
techniques. As such, market entry becomes increasingly important for generating these 
externalities. Additionally, potential and existing entrepreneurs also learn from failing and 
failed businesses. They learn what not to do or what to do differently. Market must, therefore, 
be free from excessive interventions which do not allow firms to fail for these failure 
externalities to be effective (Ateljevic and Page, 2009).  
It can also be of great importance to provide governmental support on small-scaled 
businesses. This does not say that direct interventions (for instance, specially designed credit 
schemes) are more important than indirect ones (for instance, in terms of development of 
infrastructure and creating a business-friendly environment) for the growth of these 
businesses. In many cases, subsidized credit accompanied by appropriate public policies, 
which make it easier for small-scaled businesses to distribute and market their output and to 
buy their raw materials, is much more effective than introducing too many special support 
schemes for them within a distorted market (Tambunan, 2008) 
 
3.3.2.1 Soft Budget Constraints 
Soft budget constraints (SBC) define one of the most important regulative institutional effects 
and usually appear as some sort of relaxation in the strict relationship between expenditure 
and earnings. The effects on overall entrepreneurship can be quite severe, favoring specific 
market areas through institutions – typically the State – making relaxations of the excess of 
expenditure over earnings. These relaxations typically take the form of subsidies (cost 
overruns), taxation, credit and administrative tariffs, which will be explained in more detail 
below.  
As stressed above, state-owned enterprises or other forms where the state is involved in the 
ownership often face ‘softer’ budget constraints than, for example, private owned enterprises. 
There are often two types of explanations for the existence of SBC: the exogenous and 
endogenous. Exogenous effects are coming from outside the system and cannot be explained 
by the model itself. They are usually applied as governmental attempts to create or gain 
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political power in the state. Whereas endogenous effects, on the contrary, are often explained 
from inside the model by: entrepreneurship, innovations, educations and likewise investments. 
Based on a time-inconsistency argumentation where need of relaxation in the strict 
relationship between expenditure and earnings will occur (Lin & Tan, 1999).  
Subsidies are often used by local and national governments to adjust cost overruns based on a 
time-inconsistency argumentation. ‘Soft’ subsidies can be subject to corruption, negotiation 
and lobbying. The state will reallocate resources to its own SOEs from other sectors, this can 
be compared with the Stalin-system, where they took the state resources from the private 
agricultural sector and placed these in state run agricultural SOEs. Usually all kinds of output 
and input prices are being distorted (Lin & Tan, 1999). Normally there will be tariffs, 
governmental subsidies and so on, which will be favoring the SOEs in selective industrial 
areas often based on political grounds. This will have a significant negative impact on the 
overall entrepreneurial actions on markets not favored by the state.   
Credits are often used as an instrument in SBC and it is very common to see creation of state-
owned banks (SOB) too be able to make such subsidies. In China we could see a drop in the 
profit to investment ratio from 81 cent per dollar to 9 cent per dollar after the economic 
reform which took place in 1979 and the state had to make subsidization to SOEs often direct 
from SOB (Bryane, M. 2007). This can have devastating outcomes like in Brazil when Sao 
Paolo forced their major banks into bankruptcy (Lynette H. Ong, 2011) and as the information 
and coordination problems that occurred in the Stalin-system that failed to deliver in time. 
Once again the state had to step in and make subsidies to make investments and production 
goals in time and we could see how the SOBs arose (Lin & Tan, 1999). The viability of 
SOE’s began to run out after the economic reform, which began to take their place. And from 
1978 to 2000 we could see a decrease in non-preforming loans in the Chinese bank sector 
portfolio drop from 97% to 78%. This is a good example of the increase in debt burden during 
state leadership and creation of state-owned credit institutions and how privatization can have 
a positive effect, due to entrepreneurs destroying existing equilibriums as Schumpeter argued. 
We should also be aware of how these institutions can be influenced by corruption through 
politicized acquisition of inputs and through this gain comparative advantage and as a result 
there will be fewer innovations through entrepreneurship. This could lead to a low marginal 
productivity of capital in state sector and the quantity-restricted level of credit extended to 
non-state sectors will make both fall. Credits are also often taken on the public owned savings 
and if they crash, like demonstrated above in Sao Paolo, it could drag the public economy 
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down with it in the fall. Another problem is the upswing in managers risk aversion due to a 
new mentality thinking ‘don’t fix if it’s not broken’ because it adopt ‘safety’ thinking. Since 
all of this subsides from the state to its SOEs. You should also be aware of the managerial 
power-up within the firms because the manager is not disciplined by the market (Bryane, M. 
2007).  
Taxation is a common subject in the discussion of SBCs and can be considered on both local 
and national levels. They are often tailor-made according to the financial situation of different 
sectors, regions and forms of ownership. Leaks, postponements, ad hoc exemptions and so on 
can easily be found in the taxation system. These will be favoring the SOE to the detriment of 
private owned enterprises who will face monopolistic behavior in the state driven market, 
which will affect the non-state acting entrepreneurs in a contradict way and they will often 
find the barriers into the market to high (Nee and Opper, 2012).   
Administrative prices can be considered soft when they are set by some bureaucratic 
institution and do not freely contract seller and buyers. Then they who set them have a 
tendency to automatically adjust to cost increases in the economy by using the permissive 
cost-plus principle that automatically will adjust prices to costs. We could also find it more 
difficult for private owned businesses to get permission both locally and nationally to start or 
develop its business in desired directions. This usually has a tendency to force entrepreneurs 
to act on the informal market in LDC and it works as a great barrier for the formal market 
entry.   
4. CREDIT MARKETS  
For many poor entrepreneurs one major problem is not being able to lend enough money to 
make a new idea into reality and start earning serious money. Credit markets are not suitable 
for poor entrepreneurs with no collateral, are active in countries with no working formal 
system, and are an overall risky investment. We will consider three theories explaining why 
this might be the case, and how the latest revolution of microcredits imply a different 
interpretation. Here we will explain repayment enforcing mechanisms and also the risk taken 
by the entrepreneur in trusting the money lender. Further, we will explain how this will have 
an effect on interest rates and how this might hold entrepreneurs back from crossing the 
hump. Finally, we will explain the overall risk in entrepreneurship.      
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4.1 Credit markets: Not optimal for poor entrepreneurs   
Individuals in western societies often take for granted that if you buy something you 
simultaneously pay for the good or service your receive. But behind this is an enormous 
amount of social conditions, as well as legal mechanisms making it possible. The social 
conditions become weaker as the gap between receiving a good or a service and paying for it 
increases. An example of this would be a loan being granted, and money is advanced by a 
bank or a moneylender and must be repaid later. Stating one reason for why the need exist to 
screen potential borrower more thoroughly than potential buyers. Too find out the ability and 
the willingness to pay. Because if an individual can default on the existing credit market 
arrangements, under the existing social and legal rules, then he or she might very well do so. 
In regard to this, we know that most poor entrepreneurs will face markets within LDC with 
weak mechanism for punishing deviation from the norm. Relying on informal mechanisms 
will only work up to a certain level, where fear of sanctions against future credibility and 
trade relations can be implemented. Thereafter, the need of formal mechanisms against illegal 
actions on the market is needed (Saker, G. and Patra, P. and Sarkar, A., 2012). 
Further, the money lender will most certainly require some sort of security to approve a loan. 
This is a major problem among poor people with no access to any form of collateral, and for 
that reason, having no access to the credit market under normal circumstances. Unequal 
societies makes it impossible for a poor entrepreneur to get the credits necessary to start a 
small business, educate oneself or others, and other things involved in entrepreneurial actions.  
Absence of credit markets or imperfect credit market in LDC meant for poor individuals is a 
fundamental characteristic of unequal societies (Ray, 1998). 
Combining these two conditions will create tension between the moneylenders and the true 
entrepreneur concerning risk-taking. Moneylenders wishing to minimize the risk-taking 
involved in granting loans and this while true entrepreneurs are taking risks in each 
entrepreneurial action they perform.   
4.1.2 Theories illustrating the repayment risk 
When a poor entrepreneur wants to receive a loan for a new business start-up there will be 
three major factors to take into account: (1) Punishment for illegal actions (informal and 
formal mechanisms), (2) contemporary financial assets of the entrepreneur that can be used as 
collateral, and (3) the entrepreneurial risk-taking involved in the new business set-up. Now, 
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we will demonstrate theoretically how this works, to get a deeper understanding of the 
significant problem standing in front of a poor entrepreneur seeking credits. 
1. Lack of incentive to repay a loan: Theoretically if you are a poor entrepreneur you would 
face fewer incentives to repay a loan (independent of inability to put up collateral) than a rich 
entrepreneur would do. This is easily understood in the light of diminishing marginal utility, 
where each additional unit of money in hand means far more to a poor individual than to a 
rich individual (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). In Figure 1 with utility on the vertical axis and 
income on the horizontal axis, we can see the same loan to be repaid denoted L by a poor and 
a rich individual. The area A represent the utility loss for a poor person XP repaying the loan, 
and area B representing the utility loss for a rich person YR repaying the same loan. This do 
clearly indicate a lower incentives for a poor person compared to a rich person to repay a 
loan, and therefore a poor person involves a larger risk. This does not include externalities 
that might, for example, enforce punishments on the rich person giving that person larger 
incentives to do his repayment due to the risk.    
 
2. Heterogeneity in the default probability: The most important thing for a micro financial 
institution (MFI) to determine before granting a loan is the probability of the risk of default. 
They will naturally target a hundred percent repayment rate (denoted Ptarget), and this will 
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determine the size of the loan given to a potential entrepreneur. The loan-taker on the other 
hand will always base his or her preferred loan size on expected return. Most likely an 
entrepreneur will believe in a return increasing function, and therefore always prefer a bigger 
loan (Godquin, 2004). Entrepreneurs are also per definition more risk-taking in their new 
ideas, believing in high expected return on investments – otherwise they could be accounted 
for as casual workers. If default probability increases with loan size under heterogeneity, then 
the safer borrower (l) will be granted a lager loan as shown in Figure 2 (Freimer and Gordon, 
1965; Godquen, 2004). Both groups will intercept on the vertical axis above origin Pmin due to 
external factors as illness, accidental destruction of the borrowers productive assets, or 
planned default. The risk can also defer taking into account for factors as initial endowment, 
mortal hazard and strategic default associated costs (Godquen, 2004). The conclusion (larger 
loans should only be granted to safe borrowers) is of great importance in understanding the 
difficulties for many poor entrepreneurs. Since it contradicts everything an entrepreneur 
stands for, namely taking risks in new ideas.  
 
3. Wealth available for collateral, expected profit and punishment for default: Suppose 
that the startup cost of a business (e.g., the acquisition of sewing machines and other 
equipment, and renting a local place to run a business) is given by the amount I. The business 
itself consists of hiring m industrial workers to produce an output q. The entrepreneur pays 
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them a wage of w each. This must give the sewing machine business a profit equals to q-wm. 
Now imagining the entrepreneur receiving a loan and repaying it at an interest rate of r. Then 
the net profit is easy to calculate as (q - wm) - (1 + r)I, and with this information in hand it is 
easy to figure out whether a person with some given starting wealth W will be granted a loan 
adequate enough for entrepreneurship (Ray, 1998).   
Now (if the entrepreneur received the loan) he or she can set up the W as a collateral and start 
a business (e.g., a factory), gain profits and start repayments (1 + r)I. The entrepreneur can 
always default the loan for –W(1 + R) at the risk of being captured and punished, but as 
mentioned above this can be a tricky and sometimes impossible thing to do in some LDCs 
(especially if social implications makes everyone stop at the same time).  
If we imagining a fine being paid as a punishment denoted F, and a fraction λ of the profit 
maintained from the business. The fact that λ is only a fraction captured, and that the 
entrepreneur may not be caught for sure, and even if the entrepreneurs is, it may not be 
possible for the lending authority to seize all profit. Therefore, the entrepreneurs will honor 
the loan if:  
I(1+r) ≤ W(1+r) + F + λ{q – mw(t)}, 
And rearranging this inequality, we obtain the requirement, 
    
         ( )  
   
  
This is fundamental for the understanding of this model and tells us that banks and 
moneylenders will only advance a loan to an individual with an initial wealth ‘high enough’. 
And if the entrepreneur is below the requirements of receiving a loan, then he or she cannot 
credibly convince the lender that he or she will repay the loan. This leads us to a very 
important conclusion: Individuals who start out with a wealth lower than the critical level are, 
therefore, unable to be entrepreneurs whether they want to be or not. This concludes in that 
the target individuals throughout my theses, below or just above the poverty line, would not 
due to this theory be able to receive a loan from the bank or money leaders. They will be in 
need of some sort of substitution for regular banks and moneylenders and one example highly 
debated right now is microcredits for poor people. 
To be noted is that the smaller F (expected cost of imprisonment) and λ (the fraction of your 
business profit that your bank can appropriate), the more stringent is the requirement of initial 
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wealth. This means that if both F and λ equals zero, then the credit market would break down 
as a result. The constraint reduces to W ≥ I and in this case the entrepreneurs would finance 
their own business (Ray, 1998). 
4.2 Microcredits  
Microcredits are small financial loans issued to poor individuals seeking to start their own 
businesses. The size of the loan varies between countries and does not usually exceed a 
couple hundred dollars (businessdictionary.com). They are usually monitored closely with 
weekly meetings, and retrieved in cooperative to minimize the risk involved (Banerjee and 
Duflo, 2011). Until the last two decades these types of loans have been mostly provided by 
informal organizations. Usually due to the major problem with countries relying extensively 
on public sector ownership of banks (common in Asia), and the allocation of credits and its 
pricing have been heavily regulated. The government interventions have focused on financing 
public sector deficits through controlling interest rates and by allowing credits to priority 
activities (Ahmed, 2006). Something that is – and has been – undergoing significant global 
change due to the knowledge of entrepreneurship among the poor being a leading reason for 
economic growth. Facts have shown that poor individuals are willing to repay their loans and 
this even under existing lack of formal mechanisms.  
To understand why many economists worldwide define microcredits as the latest revolution 
we have to go back to de definition of entrepreneurship, and the exclusion of self-
employment. Microcredit has shown to have a significant effect on poverty alleviation (Alam, 
2002; Banerjee and Duflo, 2011), at least temporarily. However, as will be argued for below, 
micro-credits most often only lifts individuals over the poverty line into self-employment. 
This will enable them to save a little, sustain themselves above the nutrition level, and other 
necessities. However, the problem is that microcredits are only optimal for individuals 
satisfied with small changes (Alam, 2012). A study in Sri Lanka showed that if a money 
lender gave a poor individual, for example, $250 in credits it would invest everything in its 
business. However, if you raised the amount to $500 it would still only invest $250, and the 
rest would be invested in luxury goods (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). They seem to be satisfied 
with what they have and cannot see the potential in investing everything for increasing future 
income. However, the entrepreneurs (the investors) will most likely be constrained by factors 
as time (amount of repayments needed to receive the amount of money needed) and 
uncertainty (level of risk involved), both concludes in incentives for repayments (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2011).  
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4.3 Repayment Enforcing Mechanism 
4.3.1 Social Punishment 
The social impact is of great importance when it comes to influencing beliefs, values, and 
norms among groups of people. These social impacts will – when they are of good character – 
often work as important complements to the often slow and creaky court system within LDCs 
globally. Moneylenders usually provide either the more common joint-liable repayment 
contracts or less common individual ones – both likely to be optimal (Banerjee and Duflo, 
2011). Whereas, the joint-liable contracts work in a cooperated form, sharing the 
responsibility of repayment, like with the famous Grameen Bank (grameen-info.org). Within 
the system building on pyramided forms in groups of five to ten people (Madajewicz, 2010). 
The first smaller loans are granted to the bottom of the pyramided (say three people), and 
when they have repaid their loans, the next will be granted. This one will be lager then the one 
before, and split among the next in line (now split on two). Finally, the largest loan will be 
granted to the head of the pyramided often the manager of the project (Varian, 2009).  
Studies has started to indicate success in making repayment an implicit social contract 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2011), and formal contracts therefore have started to move away from 
joint-liable to individual contracts. This without the risk increase involved in lending out 
money to entrepreneur. Earlier we argued for informal mechanism being bounded to the 
nearest group of people (town, village, family), and that outsourcing outside this sector would 
need formal mechanism to enforce punishment if illegal activities took place. Maintaining the 
argument itself, we now should visualizing informal organizations starting to spread this 
behavior within itself to other sectors. This would enable these socially implemented 
conditions to maintain legal activity, at least within itself through its members, and the area of 
the economy they have transformed. Explaining how some providers of microcredits like the 
MFI Spandana had approximately 590 million rupees ($34,5 million USA PPP) of principal 
outstanding in the Krishna District alone, representing a 15 present share of Spanadan’s gross 
loan portfolio across India 2006 (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). 
However, relying on social punishment can be a very dangerous game to play, both for the 
moneylenders and for the entrepreneurs. The risk of attitudes changing is always there and 
other agents benefiting from it would most likely help them to change. Regardless of if it is 
illegal or not, due to the lack of well-working formal institutions that prevents this behavior.   
28 
 
The following example will illustrate the significant risk involved in relying on social 
punishment based on a true example regarding Spandana 2006 in Krishna District, in India: 
One day a very real looking (fake) newspapers started to show up telling stories about how 
Spandana’s owner had killed her husband. That the MFI did not have a future and therefore 
there was no need in repaying your loan. Further the owner had plans to flee to America to 
avoid facing her obligations. This was the first attack which she fought back by driving across 
the state, showing up in villages telling them that she was still here, and did not plan to go 
anywhere. However, just months after the first attack the second one went off, accusing 
Spandana of putting too much pressure on its clients. In fact, so much that farmers across the 
state had committed suicide. This they falsely claimed, had resulted in the state making it 
illegal to repay ones loans (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011)!  
This was an ingenious move – committed by the government – to change the underling factors 
among borrowers which the social conditions built on. The system was built on that when one 
borrower did the repayment, so would others believing in the system and fearing the social 
impact it could have not doing ones repayments. On the same grounds the system began to 
have the opposite effect and people stopped doing their payments as a consequence. After one 
year 70 percent of Spandana’s debts were still unpaid for. They tried increasing people’s 
loans, but nothing changed. Not even individuals with their last repayment before they could 
be granted a next larger one did their repayments (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011).  
The illustration above provides a good idea of how strong the social impact can be – both for 
good and bad causes. How the economic climate can change during a very short time and 
putting an end to the economic growth. It also gives us a good understanding of why 
moneylenders can provide microcredits with usually high repayment rates. However, this still 
does not provide solution to the problem of financing true entrepreneurial activities, involving 
a lager risk within the activity itself. What it does provide is a less risky market climate 
overall and an implemented thinking among citizens of doing right, and thereby its 
repayments assuming ‘good thinking’.   
4.3.2 The risk taken by poor entrepreneurs   
Above we have argued for the risk involved in lending out money to poor entrepreneurs due 
to a lack of incentives to do repayments. However, it should not be forgotten that the 
entrepreneur is also taking a risk – outside the risk involved within entrepreneurial business 
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itself – by applying for a loan due to asymmetric information (Ray, 1998). To illustrate this 
kind of risk-taking we will consider a short example:  
An entrepreneur is walking in to some sort of moneylender with no earlier experience of 
applying for a loan. Nor does he or she possess any prior experience of running a business 
making this the first time. Then the person probably understands that under these 
circumstances information is asymmetric (the moneylender having more information). 
Furthermore, the entrepreneurs will most likely experience the interests being split. Where the 
entrepreneur is willing to take a bigger risk on belief of the great business idea and the 
moneylender will be experiencing the moral hazard problem (the cost of the entrepreneurs’ 
risk-taking will be borne by others). Also the entrepreneur will not be sure that the 
moneylender will act in his or hers best interest, and this is why the principal-agent problem 
theory (Godquin, 2004) is commonly applied in money lending to poor entrepreneurs.  
The principal (the moneylender) is supposed to have control of over the scarce assets or 
production process (lending microcredits to poor entrepreneurs) which gives monopolistic or 
quasi-monopolistic
7
 power, enabling the lender to dictate the terms of the contract. However, 
the agent (the entrepreneur) might be aware of alternative opportunities of retrieving 
microcredits, usually referred to as a participation constraint (Ray, 1998). Although more 
microcredit providers arise, the lack of knowledge might still be there among these 
entrepreneurs to compare contract-deals. Leading to contracts being signed under conditions 
of what the entrepreneurs believe will maximize his or her utility, built on preferences that 
might not include hidden information. Of course this dilemma can be viewed the other way 
around and are usually referred to as the incentive constraint (Ray, 1998). Arguably this 
principle cannot exclude the understanding of the agent taking actions most suited to his own 
preferences. However, this problem is often solved with the joint-liability model (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2011).   
Without some sort of formal or informal ways enabling these entrepreneurs to compare their 
options, it will be difficult to know if utility maximization is constrained by hidden 
information. Important to mention is also that even if there is only one option available for 
these entrepreneurs it does not automatically mean that they should take it – the high interest 
rates can by itself prevent these entrepreneurs from ever leaving the state of poverty.   
                                                          
7
 Quasi-monopoly is defined as when there is more than one provider of the particular good or service, but the 
nature of the competition resulting in similar service or pricing towards the customers.   
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4.3.3 High interest rates 
The problem with the high interest rates can be derived from poor entrepreneurs not being 
able to secure a loan due to a lack of collaterals. This combined with the lack of business 
experience, uncertainty of business plan, and the market risks, all speaks for a denial of a loan 
(Opper and Nee, 2012). This forces the poor into the informal sector were the interest rates 
are much higher and resulting in the poor being stuck in the repayment trap. This debt-cycle, 
prevents them from being able to flourish, which might result in them crossing the hump and 
thereby leaving the P-curve illustrated in figure 3. Most interest rates for people below the 
poverty line, living on less then ‘one-dollar-day’ per person at 1985 USD PPP 
(web.worldbank.org), would make Bank of Americas usually high interest rates of 20 percent 
per year to pale in comparison. On average in India entrepreneurs receiving credits from an 
informal financial institution are faced with interest rates around 3.13 per month (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2011), which would equal to 44.75 per year (compounded). Important to mention 
is that this is the lower part due to the estimated yearly interest rates among poor that lies 
around 40 to 200 percent per year (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011).  
The Figure 3 is illustrating two production technologies that poor entrepreneurs might face 
entering into business. The P-curve is giving a kind of low marginal return in the beginning 
when your investments are low, but on the other hand the R-curve is giving no return on your 
investment at all. After a while the P-curve will end up to be a bad investment giving almost 
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no return on your money. However, if you in point M in some way are able to invest enough 
money to put yourself on the R-curve then you will find yourself with a very good marginal 
return on your investments. The O-R is representing the actual return on your investment if 
you are able to cross the hump. This explains the typical S-shape dilemma: invest little and 
make little money, or invest enough to cross the hump and invest more and make more 
money.  However, crossing the hump is not an option for most poor entrepreneurs not being 
able to lend enough money to reasonable interest rates. Saving is for most not an option. Say 
you initial wealth is $100 and has a 25 percent return on your profit. Then assume that you 
could invest everything the next year (now $125) and you need $10,000 to cross the hump. It 
would take you approximately 21 years to be able to cross the hump (Banerjee and Duflo, 
2011).  
If we assume that these high interest rates are holding entrepreneurs back from lending money 
and that the good kind of money lenders are afraid due to the risks mentioned above. Then we 
need to find a solution that enables entrepreneurs to lend more money to lower interest rates. 
Joint-liability contracts could be one way to receive larger amount of money as in the famous 
Grameen Bank (grammen-info.org) building on pyramid formed groups consisting of five to 
ten members (Madajewicz, 2010), receiving larger loans as they climb the repayment pyramid 
(Varian, 2009). However, this has been tested and works in some cases but hardly in all. 
Another reason for not crossing the hump is the constant investments in many projects instead 
of one. Even if Matthew Hussey would argue for many projects at the same time to minimize 
the risk of losing everything (Hussey, 2011) this does not apply on poor entrepreneurs. Some 
running three different businesses: selling something to eat in the morning, trading saris 
during the day, and trading bread to make necklaces in the evening. This holds them back 
from ever making enough in one project to cross the hump and they are therefore stuck in 
poverty (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011).     
4.3.4 The overall risk in entrepreneurship 
Until now we have argued for risks included in granting and receiving a loan. Most due to the 
lack of working formal ways of punishment for illegal actions, the lack of collateral, and 
hidden information concerning both sides’ incentives. Now, we will go through three 
additional important things influencing the level of risk aversion (seeking to minimize the 
uncertainties) conducted by the entrepreneur. First, we will see if an entrepreneur truly is less 
risk averse than a casual working individual. Secondly, we shall see if the gender-factor has 
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any impact on being more or less prone to take risks. Finally, we shall see if monitoring and 
training might have an effect on entrepreneurs.  
Entrepreneurs: As we have argued, entrepreneurship is usually based on a belief in a great 
business idea that might create opportunities in the future and generate profit. The risk lies in 
not being able to do exact predictions about the future, and acting under asymmetric 
information that might influence many aspects of the entrepreneurial process, including the 
process of opportunity discovery, the decision to exploit, the identification of the individuals 
who pursue opportunities and the resources acquisition process (Shane, 2003). These kind of 
everyday risks are of no concern for a casual worker, save the possibility of losing a job. 
On the other hand, an economic experiment preformed in China showed no significant 
difference between entrepreneurs and ‘normal’ individuals in handling uncertainty. The 
experiment involved 700 entrepreneurs and 200 randomly sampled people that could make a 
choice between to alternatives: (A) a guaranteed amount between ¥360 and ¥90, or (B) attend 
a lottery that could give you either ¥580 or ¥15. The participants had to do ten individual 
choices under less than twenty minutes, while the gap between option A and B decreased. 
Resulting in that the rational individual would at some point choose the lottery. The result 
gave a mean value of 6.25 for entrepreneurs, and a mean value of 6.10 for the control. These 
results do not confirm the argument that entrepreneurs are of a special breed (Opper and Nee, 
2012). 
However, the experiment fails to illustrate the true conditions that entrepreneurs in LDC are 
working under. Most of the time the uncertainty about the future can result in a negative lost 
with serious consequences for a poor entrepreneur, usually acting without any kind of 
insurance. In the experiment you will never make any actually losses entering the game (at 
least the entrepreneur will receive ¥15). Also we could expect a risk-increasing function, 
having an exponential appearance, with the amount of risk on the vertical axis and the amount 
of input in form of financial asset on the horizontal axis. This is in some ways illustrated in 
the example above. However, the entrepreneur will most likely make the decision on a much 
sharper curve, because each unit of financial asset has a higher value. This does not say that 
one extra unit of financial asset are not valued by all poor people. What it does say is that one 
extra unit of financial asset will have a possibly larger impact for an entrepreneurs, illustrated 
in Figure 3. While the casual worker only will experience a temporary change, and then fall 
back on the same constant expenditure curve – meaning it takes less of a risk due to future 
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uncertainty hiding the unknown in markets. However, this only shows that entrepreneurs are 
able to handle a great amount of risk, but still fails to illustrate if there is a difference between 
entrepreneurial and casual people in risk aversion. To be able to illustrate this is much more 
difficult. Still in my opinion it is reasonable to assume that poor entrepreneurs are less risk 
averse daring to enter the market under the conditions given. Assuming that it is of free will 
and not forced.  
Gender factors:  
To understand female risk aversion in LDC it is of significant importance to understand the 
conditions they are facing within these countries. That is, if traditional entrepreneurship 
constrain females from committing entrepreneurial actions due to cultural factors, or if they 
are just in general less risk-taking. Together with SEWA Bank, in Ahmedabad, a field study 
took place to identify the different effect that constraints placed on women by religions and 
castes could have in forms of restrictions. Most of these restrictions concerned mobility and 
social interactions that were presented as five norms: ability to socialize alone, requirements 
to cover the face or wear a veil, ability to speak directly to elders, ability to leave the house or 
neighborhood alone, and ability to remarry. A five-day program was developed by Freedom 
of Hunger to teach SEWA Bank and its members to avoid excess debt. The result that could 
be shown was that ‘Muslims in India place more restrictions on women’s contact with people 
outside, but not within, the sphere of kinship. Because Muslim women are entitled to a share 
in family real estate, controlling their relationship family real estate, controlling their 
relationships with males outside the family can be crucial to the maintenance of family 
property and prestige’ (Field, Jayachandran and Pande,  2010). 
Among Hindus the upper caste
8
 is living a far more restrictive life then the scheduled caste, 
since the upper caste has to live a pure life without sexual relations, marriage, and in some 
extreme cases, without contact of scheduled caste. If they got married they are restricted from 
contact with other men, cannot get remarried ever again, and have restricted mobility outside 
of their house. This will restrict these women from labor participation. The scheduled caste is 
looked upon as lower in the eyes of Hindu hierarchy, but for western people probably viewed 
as a more beneficial lifestyle – fewer social restrictions and, by virtue of being independent 
                                                          
8
 Hindus are as individuals born in to different caste, and the higher up on the life stage they are, the more 
responsibility (dharma) they will have (Eriksson, Mattsson and Hedengren, 2003). The upper caste are placed at 
the top of the life stage, and the scheduled cast on the bottom.  
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earners, enjoy greater financial autonomy and increased control over household financial 
decisions relative to upper caste women (Field, Jayachandran and Pande, 2010). 
These presented conditions are everyday life for many women living in LDC and should give 
a rather clear picture of what might really hold some of them back. Since, businesses owned 
by women entrepreneurs are one of the fastest growing entrepreneurial activities in the world 
today (Brush et al, 2009). Moreover, female participation in entrepreneurship is due to 
increase economic pressure and awareness as a result of increasing levels of education 
(Tambunan, 2008). Also moneylenders in LDC seem to argue that lending money to a female 
is less of a risk than lend money to a man. More than 90 percent of all microcredits are 
outstanding loans to women (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). However, this raises several 
questions about female entrepreneurs and why they are less willing to take a risk. Studies 
indicate that women value family wealth more than men in general do (Todaro, 2006). If this 
is true, than it seem to weigh for women facing yet another constraint, namely family wealth – 
holding them back, where the risk-taking can affect other family members. This would place 
them in a vicious circle, where barriers are lower for women to receive microcredits and this 
due to less risk-taking and less, per definition, true entrepreneurship. Not going too deep into 
the subject, more studies need to be done comparing women among each other and test if 
female entrepreneurship are constrained by these kind of parameters (family, number of 
children, and likewise). As a contribution to studies that indicating on women to be in 
generally less growth orientated than men (Coleman, 2007).     
Monitoring and training: There is a clear tension between microcredits and true 
entrepreneurship, which is associated with risk-taking and occasional failing (Banerjee and 
Duflo, 2011). Therefore it has been important, especially for moneylenders, to find a way of 
minimizing the risk involved, and this has resulted in programs that aim at monitoring and 
train entrepreneurs, in becoming better business runners. This part will be more thoroughly 
explained under the following section ‘Education’, due to its significant importance for a 
better understanding of the conditions poor entrepreneurs are faced with. Before we move 
over to the educational section we should mention that monitoring of borrowers seems to have 
an effect on their repayments. However, there seem to be almost no correlation between the 
time-period spent between each visit (e.g., by a bank man), and repayment rates. This means 
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that, if the bank man is making daily, weekly, or monthly visits, it makes no difference to the 
repayments
9
 (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). 
5. EDUCATION 
Below we shall define entrepreneurship education, and try to demonstrate two distinct 
differences within the area itself. First we will explain the typical entrepreneurial education 
provided to poor entrepreneurs, in the best of cases, mainly focusing on improving business 
skills. Secondly, we shall see how entrepreneurial education could be introduced in 
combination with other disciplines, to create development that could benefit poor 
entrepreneurs, and the country in whole.   
5.1 Defining entrepreneurship education 
Entrepreneurship education can be defined as an organized process of developing 
entrepreneurial traits and values in an individual; enhancing a culture of creativity and 
innovativeness in seeking, developing, exploring, and making use of opportunities; imbibing 
managerial skills; inculcating a systematic management to address the needs to effectively 
and efficiently run the business, and achieve profitability, growth, and sustainability. This 
process can be both formal (universities and colleges) or informal (other agencies promoting 
entrepreneurship education). Both with the aim of developing individuals with innovative 
spirits that calculates risks, has a creative attitude, is adept to their environment, sees values of 
business propositions for themselves and the society at large, while seeking and making good 
use of opportunities (Jing, 2012).   
5.2 Informal Education 
Small sophisticated businesses, in for example Colombo in Sri Lanka, are often aware of what 
is going on around them in their business climate. This cannot be said about the large 
potential group of entrepreneurs standing outside the market. They have most of the times not 
received any kind of formal or informal education (Tharmaratnam, 1986).    
We could have a look at an example from the Philippines as illustration of a typical problem 
encountered among LDC in Asia. A typical Filipino entrepreneur is male, married, 25-44 
years old, high school graduate, and comes from the low income group. They are driven by 
                                                          
9
 The study did not include borrowers with a longer time-period between each visit than a month (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2011) 
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necessity and more than half are engaged in retail trade (a typical trade in most Asian 
countries). There is very little application of technology and minimal use of innovation. 
Seventy percent are engaged in businesses that do not generate employment since the 
entrepreneurs assumes all functions in the business. Most of the businesses employ less than 
four employees and very few have 20 employees or more. However, Filipino entrepreneurs 
see business opportunities and are highly confident that they have the knowledge and skills 
needed to do business. Yet in what seems to be a contradictory attitude, they fear failure and 
have a very low tendency to take risks. Most of them are only engaging in previous work 
fields or in family businesses (Velasco, 2013).  
The problem here seems to be that informal entrepreneurship programs teaches their students 
to engages in projects for start-ups of products that lack growth opportunity (e.g., food stands 
along the street, clothes and fashion wear, handicrafts, and household gadgets). This is more 
of necessity entrepreneurship trying (what we define as self-employment) to provide one job 
with an income, and in the way alleviate poverty (Velasco, 2013). Also, moneylenders have 
gone into the business of educating their borrowers in hope to minimize the overall risk-
taking. They are often developing programs that will teach their borrowers to accumulating 
capital (saving, investing and less risk-taking) and in business skills (write a business plan, 
repayment plans, calculating risks, and so on), to ensure repayments from their borrowers that 
they argue for can be equalized to success (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). In one way it might be 
true that they actually make enough profit to do their repayments. On the other hand, they 
seem to never be able to cross the hump and are stuck in low marginal returns on their 
investments. This is, as argued, a contradictory strategy towards entrepreneurship that needs 
more focus on opportunity spotting, implementation of business plans, management skills, 
encouragement to believe in an idea, and ways to think ‘outside the box’ (Velasco, 2013). 
Probably the lack of knowledge is the biggest barrier within the entrepreneurial educational 
efforts.  
5.3 Formal Education 
During the time of 1965-90 East Asia enjoyed spectacular rates of economic growth among 
eight countries/territories: Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore in the East, and 
three Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. This miracle have been 
exposed to countless studies indicating different factors causing this growth, and we have 
come to know that these countries have taken huge strides in accumulation of physical and 
human capital. The human capital levels, by all indicators, are very high relative to per capita 
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income levels. As an example Korea had a secondary school enrollment rate of 88 percent (up 
from 35 percent in 1965). Even the World Bank argued that the two-thirds of the observed 
growth in these economics can be attributed to the accumulation of physical and human 
capital, and primarily education is the single largest contributor among these factors (Ray, 
1998).  
UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDG) is the eight goals that the world’s nation agreed 
in 2000 to reach by 2015. Two of them, namely the second and the third, are respectively 
‘ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a 
full course of primary schooling’ and to ‘eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary 
education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015’. In India, 95 
percent of children now have a school within a half mile or so. It seem like it might not be a 
lack of educational supply that hinder children to get educated. More generally, the universal 
problem of finding school boring, and the parental problem of keeping their children in school 
seem to be more like it (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). Might this be something we can view as a 
governmental defeat, or more generally as bad governmental interventions? In Karnataka, 
India, a mother of six (widow) seemed unable to keep all of her children in school, this could 
first be assumed to be a result of the dead father. This seemed not to be true, because she 
alone was able to provide the family with the basic needs. Some of the children that were set 
of to work had dropped out of school because they found it boring. Two of her children just 
refused to go (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). Many might now ask themselves why the children 
can refuse such important thing (by most generally believed in western countries)? This is 
because the parents know that the returns on education are low of actual benefit. For example 
in 2002, Robert Jensen of the University of California at Los Angeles teamed up with some 
centers in India that were part of small social revolutions in educating young woman. This 
enabled them to find employment in business process outsourcing centers in these villages. 
After only a year the girls between the age of five to eleven were about 5 percentage points 
more likely to be enrolled in school in the villages where there was recruiting. The reason for 
this was simply that parents started to find out that educating girls had economic value, and 
therefore they was also happy to invest. The conclusion is that if we make education more 
attractive, then the demand for it will go up and there will be a pressure to supply it (Jensen, 
2010).      
The World Bank and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have sponsored 
studies of how to engage nations in the promotion of entrepreneurship education (Velasco, 
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2013). Programs as Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) has for example had collaboration 
between universities for the development of human capital (asiaseed.org), and Consultancy 
Based Learning for ASEAN SMEs (COBLAS) aims to teach skills and tools in the local 
university setting, by using local procedures and contexts in the conduct of entrepreneurship 
education (Velasco, 2013).  Further, entrepreneurship education can take place at social 
forums that enhance and help people who want to become entrepreneurs (weforum.org). 
Entrepreneurial success stories tend to build on passion, hard work, and more often luck. 
These factors do not need formal entrepreneurship education. However, studies have shown 
that entrepreneurs that went to the university have a higher propensity to succeed and expand 
the enterprise (Velasco, 2013). One problem is also that most universities offering 
entrepreneurship education programs subscribe to the notion of research through publication 
in ISSI journals. Students and faculty alike do not have tangible material to fully understand 
the environment as for example the Filipino entrepreneurs will have to face. As an example 
many schools offering classes on preparation of business plan, but not on the actual 
implementation on the business plan. Further, most teacher do not have experience in running 
a business nor do they have consultancy experience to share with the students. 
Entrepreneurship is learned better through experience and what better way to learn it than 
from the testimonies of teachers?  The fact remains that schools have the responsibility to 
support entrepreneurship education. Also formal entrepreneurship education programs seem 
to focus on high growth opportunity products. However, these programs are often focused on 
technological areas as engineering and sciences, and teaching seems more focused on students 
passing the exams making them see the opportunities for a possible career path of 
entrepreneurship (Velasco, 2013).  
There seems to be a clear interest among leaders in LDCs to increase entrepreneurial skills 
among its citizens within the formal sector. At the same time poor people find education in 
general to be a bad investment with low return. Some people believe that some poor families 
running business are blind to see the potential economic growth through investment in 
opportunities. What they need is a business plan. On the other hand, some argue that they are 
happy with what they got, and do not fancy entrepreneurship education or education in 
general for themselves. What they value is for example their son to become a teacher, or their 
girl to become a nurse, and the interest is in general is very weak for entrepreneurial activities. 
Also the typical educational background that can be received is traditional education (study of 
law, liberal arts and physical science), and therefore they will not get prepared for either 
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employment or self-employment, nor entrepreneurial activities. There is also a lack of 
awareness of business management at post university stages (Tharmaratnam, 1986).   
6. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION  
Entrepreneurship seems to be a product of a set of unique skills that the entrepreneurs have 
adopted from the environment he has grown up in. This implies that, some will learn to be 
extremely talented in a niched area (skilled workers), others are creator of change within a 
profession they choose (true entrepreneurs), and some will fill other important roles in the 
production process (casual workers). This makes it very difficult to understand entrepreneurs 
and measure entrepreneurship, due to its many skills (personal attributes) and areas it works 
within (creating entrepreneurial outcome). The GEM measurement focuses on self-
employment, and therefore gives a distorted picture of entrepreneurial activities within LDC 
countries. Arguing that self-employment is a positive indicator for entrepreneurial activities 
within a country, and therefor fails to see the true negative picture behind self-employment 
(not saying that it is not preferable to unemployment). However, what it does say is that there 
is a need of refocusing the resources enabling entrepreneurship, this point will be argued 
below. Further the WBGES measurement is excluding the informal sector, which can almost 
be found a bit ridiculous when thinking about for example Indian city of Mumbai, where the 
informal sector is one of the largest entrepreneurial sectors. There is not a single measurement 
yet discovered that can capture all entrepreneurial activities within a country, and likewise 
there is not a unique formula for creation of entrepreneurship. However, this does not mean 
that we cannot provide a better climate for entrepreneurs to grow, by providing them with 
tools that enables them to act on their opportunity-ideas. These tools should stimulate 
‘creational’ entrepreneur to explore and create new market processes, which the one with 
‘alertness’ for opportunities within a market process should act on. Hopefully, this results in a 
more entrepreneurial climate and therefor more activity in the market, and less unconstructive 
self-employment.  
We gave an example of individuals within Sri Lanka that would only invest their money to a 
certain level, and thereafter they would use the rest for consumption of luxury goods. This 
would most likely not have happened in China before the privatization (or now for that 
matter) among most families, due to the strict family codes of honor for its members that is 
missing in Sri Lanka. The reason might be the over 25 years of civil war that lies behind the 
people of Sri Lank, preventing them to see long term opportunities or trust the system. China 
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for example did provide its citizens with the primary securities. However, it could also be the 
self-employment reason and that a job costs a certain amount of money, and that the excess of 
money over cost would be used for temporary enjoyments. This is because they are not 
entrepreneurs, and therefore not able to see development opportunities. This behavior will 
results in larger loans being granted, due to the lack of risk-taking under the assumption of 
heterogeneity in the default probability. Resulting in resources being spent on garbage instead 
for where they were intended, on development projects.   
Microcredits are beloved by many economists around the globe failing to understand the 
problem with focusing on individuals crossing the poverty line, instead of entrepreneurial 
activities. This because it is resulting in people getting pegged downed in lives temporary a 
bit better than before at the cost of the overall societal wealth. The aforementioned said under 
the assumption that entrepreneurial activity will results in development, and that mass copy or 
mimic this activity would result in its destruction. What this means is that temporary shifts for 
the better among some citizens will result in an overall decrease in the wealth of their society, 
and indicating on the importance of regulation and protection against this behavior on the 
market.  
However, change is a very complex thing to implement due to normative, regulative and 
cognitive mechanism that force individuals, and thereby institutions, to act in a certain way 
within the informal and formal sector. The goal should be to provide the markets with good 
self-reinforcing institutions that through collective actions will guide the interest of actors and 
enforce principal-agent relationships. Further we argued for strong leadership (Hong Kong) to 
be an important mechanism for institutional change, and that if people got richer the general 
effect would be a change for the better. This point toward, that the strategy used by Spandana 
in Krishna District, in India, was one of the right ones to implement a change for the better. 
That under strong leadership infiltrated important factors and segments of the market and 
regulates it through the social power of the collective, and at the same time creates or finds 
incentives among the citizens to either supply or demands this change. However, for this 
change to occur there is in need of a basic level of wealth (infrastructure, primary securities, 
education, and so on) to make it possible. It would not be an option in too chaotic countries.  
More interesting, if we look at The Philippines we would find a country with people 
optimistic towards entrepreneurship and what really stops them is the lack of risk-taking. This 
is probably the result of non-working regulative mechanism not providing them with some 
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level of basic security, promising them not to be socially excluded or end up on the street. 
However, if we look at Sweden that provides entrepreneurs with all desirable tools to be a 
successful entrepreneur, we would find two factors that most likely hinders many 
entrepreneurs: (1) a normative constraints telling the swedes that success is something you 
should not ‘ brag’ about and, (2) a regulative constraints that ends up being a cognitive 
constraint saying that failure is not an option (prevents Swedes from trying again), because 
their names will be in every register for others to see if failure became the outcome of their 
first try. What this tells us is that there is not one perfect context to be found, because the 
solution have to include factors such as culture, social conditions, educational levels, health 
security, and so on, making the analysis of each country unique and likewise the solution to 
their situation.  
There is also a danger in letting actors form the outside in on the domestic markets. They 
never truly know what will come over the bridge when it is built, and more important – what 
they will bring with them. Developed countries will most likely have some sort of formal 
security against for example illegal actions, which LDCs might not have. Without these 
regulations illegal activities could arise like hunting endangered species, as with China 
entering India and Nepal hunting rhinos for making aphrodisiac, or the building of factories in 
African countries at the expense of the environment. Large companies might benefit from the 
weaknesses in LDCs and might take over comparative advantages or natural resources (for 
example diamonds and oil in Africa, or by processing their natural resources into more 
valuable goods and thereby making almost all the profit (taking advantage of technological 
weaknesses). 
Free markets, built on trust in the formal institutions, will most likely result in a decrease in 
transaction cost and of asymmetric information, together with an increase of availability of 
financial services. This would also most likely result in trust for its leaders to put SBC on 
overall important welfare businesses (for example, medicine, education, infrastructure, and so 
on) to provide the primary security needed within a country to implement change in the 
beginning of development. However, most of the times it seem as personal interests can be 
reflected in business decisions, and that some types of businesses (not necessarily welfare 
enchanting) will face SBC, resulting in just a few kinds of businesses on the market. Also, 
state-owned enterprises with monopolistic power would have the same effect on the market 
through dictating contracts and terms on the market, which most likely will result in 
corruption that harms poor entrepreneurs.  This will in the end not be good for LDCs and their 
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citizens, with a less secured portfolio against shifts in the market and comparative advantages, 
setting them back to where they started.        
Education seems to have a week effect on entrepreneurial action on the market among poor 
undereducated individuals that fail to see the return in such investment. Another reason seems 
to be the constant focus on repayment strategies and theoretical business skills (e.g., manger 
skills, write business plans, calculate risk, opportunities evaluation, saving, and so on), instead 
of teaching them to use their innovative spirit outside the money lenders office, or the 
university. Teaching a poor entrepreneur how to write a business plan will not be to any good 
if they are not shown how to implement it in the real world and similar thinking has to be 
implemented among students at university level to encourage development. This is because 
they usually possess a unique skill that will make it easier to not fall into the trap of mass 
copy and mimic that the informal education often provides poor entrepreneurs with. The 
solution should be – no matter what level you belong to – a combination of theoretical 
learning and practical real-based-learning out in the real market. Therefore it is important that 
also the teachers as these kinds of experiences, which is not usually the case.  
As a final point we shall mention some important gender aspects on entrepreneurial activities. 
We know that 90 percent of all microcredits are given to women and that they represent the 
fastest growing area of entrepreneurial growth. They are also constrained by normative, 
regulative, and cognitive factors built on the minds of men and family preferences. Is this a 
case of perfectly incorrect resource focusing? Perhaps implementers of change should focus 
on excluding women with families, and see how these other women behave. This might 
indicate how severe the problem of cultural and contextual constraints is. Further, it would 
also demonstrate preferences among women shaping the family utility function. However, 
focusing resources only to female entrepreneurs might give a larger welfare enchanting effect 
per unite, but on the cost of missing out on male entrepreneurs.  
Policy recommendations for LDCs: The leaders within LDCs need to establish institutions 
and organizations that provide poor entrepreneurs with tools (business knowledge, securities, 
financial assets possibilities, and so on) to enable a start-up. For example, they could establish 
a self-reinforcing entrepreneurial institution that could provide towns and villages to start up 
organizations that educates, helps and stimulate entrepreneurship. They could provide loans to 
a lower interest rate and hold competitions to find great entrepreneurship ideas, and provide 
these winning ideas with desirable tools for start-up. This would benefit, not only the small 
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towns and villages, but the LDCs as a whole. Further, there should be implemented, among 
money lenders, some regulations against copy and mimic of others. For example, one 
condition to receive should be a description of their idea (not necessarily a business plan). 
This is very important to prevent incorrect resource focus to drag the welfare among all 
citizens down. Further, we need to do a research on female entrepreneurship that excludes 
females with families to see if they are more risk taking. This could provide valuable 
information indicating what resources should be focused on females before they starts a 
family, or gets forced into one (preventing this).     
Most LDCs seem to understand the importance of education in generall for development, but 
fails to provide incentives among poor to invest in it. To do this, one solution might be 
making the schools more practical and problem solving for poor, so it could result in an actual 
job, creating a new venture, or be a part of one. This could help parents to see the return on 
educational investment, and as a result make parents force their children into school in hope 
of a better future. Further, they should implement an understanding for that tools enabling 
them to find new knowledge, is more important than the knowledge itself – especially for 
creation of entrepreneurs among poor people. They should also work hard in engaging both 
formal and informal educational sector to be a part of the learning process in the market, and 
not only theoretical. Preferable would be if the leaders would enable industrial supported 
programs on all levels, provide facilities for business start-ups and registrations, and hands-on 
ways to combat failures.   
Finally, there is a need of regulating the market and the actors on it as we have established an 
understanding for in this thesis. We know that we need regulative ways to hinder copying and 
mimicking of other ideas, repayment defaults, and other illegal activities on the market. One 
way of doing this is assuming that the establishment of these other policies presented above 
will make people better off in general and therefore also supply and demand more from the 
market. The leaders also need to find ways of not letting actors that will prevent development 
and the welfare of its people to come over the bridge. This by finding some sort of solution 
benefiting them all – this however is outside the frame of this thesis. In general leaders among 
these LDCs must understand the importance of making people see and dare to believe in 
change for the better by providing them with the right tools to combat their state of living. 
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